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ABSTRACT 
Thie paper summarizes recent interpretations of government 
behavior toward agriculture in Africa and seeks to assess their 
credibility through empirical testing. 
With respect to food crops, governments are seen as intervening 
on behalf of urban interests. For cash crops, they are viewed as 
manipulating prices in order to tax, both so as to collect public 
revenues and so as to redistribute purchasing power to the consumers of 
imports, Ideological preferences also influence government behavior. 
A Note on Patterns of Market Intervention in Agrarian Africa 
Robert H ,  Bates 
California Institute of Technology 
It is a well-known fact that governments in the less developed 
nations intervene in agricultural markets in efforts to lower 
commodity prices. Schultz notes and condemns this "distortion, " 
contending that in the absence of price disincentives farmers in the 
developing nations could "turn sand into gold,111 Summarizing research 
conducted by the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, Malcolm Bale and Ernst Lutz estimate that policy induced 
price distortions in Argentina, Egypt, Pakistan and Thailand lowered 
agricultural output by tens of millions of tons and drove hundreds of 
thousands of persons· from agricultural employment (table 1),2 The
impact of price policies in less developed countries is such that 
Willis Peterson concludes: w0n the basis of [my] evidence, one 
strongly suspects that had farmers in the L,D, C,11 enjoyed the level 
of prices that prevailed in the developing nations, or even in the 
world market, there would be no such thing as a world food shortage,'� 
The question naturally arises: Why do governments behave this 
way? I have examined this question in Africa. 4 In this paper, I 
elaborate upon some answers to it and offer some modest statistical 
lb 
Table 1: Real Effects of Price Distortions, 1976 
Country Estimated Change Estimated Change Estimated Change in Agricultural Employment 
in Production in Consum2tion (average coefficients) (marginal coefficients) 
low high low high low high low high 
------�-- •ooo metric tons---------- ---------------full time workers----------------
ARGENTINA 
Wheat -2,343 -7,028 329 988 -19,525 -58,567 -39 ,050 -117,133 
Rice -20 -59 5 16 -520 -1,534 -1,040 -3,068 
Maize -1, 341 -4,083 318 953 -24,585 -74,855 -49,170 149, 710 
Beef -273 -820 187 562 -1,638 -4,920 -3,276 -9,840 
EGYPT 
Wheat -255 -786 898 2,748 -18,700 -133,096 -43,180 -133,096 
Rice -1,068 -3,204 466 1,435 -128,160 -384,480 -185,120 -555,360 
Maize -450 -506 388 1,197 -36,000 -40,480 -72,000 -80,960 
PAKISTAN 
Wheat -417 -1,299 577 1,671 -34,333 -106,951 -74,087 -230, 789 
Rice -465 -1,394 376 1,128 -44,950 -134, 753 -54,250 -162,633 
Maize -5 -15 8 25 -500 -1,500 -BOO -2,400 
THAILAND 
Rice -371 -1,165 139 323 -49,467 -155,333 -71,727 -225,233 
Maize 5 16 0 -1 400 1,280 800 2,560 
Sugar 55 166 -37 -112 -6,197 18,703 9,295 28,054 
Source: Malcolm D. Bale and Ernst Lutz, Price Distortions and Their Effects: An International ComEarison, 
World Bank Staff Working Paper No. 359 (1979). 
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tests of these political interpretations, 
In the discussion that follows, I treat separately food crops, 
which are largely grown for domestic consumption, and cash crops, 
which are largely destined for foreign markets, 
The Political Origins of Food Policy 
African governments seek low priced food. One way in which 
they do so is by regulating market transactions.5 Many control 
consumer prices; others regulate the prices at which producers can 
sell agricultural commodities; snd still others maintain an official 
government monopoly over the purchase and retail of specific food 
commodities, 6 
What are the sources of government policy toward food crops? 
Put bluntly, food policy appears to represent a form of political 
settlement, one designed to bring peaceful relations between African 
governments and their urban constituents, And it is a settlement in 
which the costs tend to be born by the farmers. 
The urban origins of African food policies are perhaps most 
clearly seen in Nigeria, If one looks at the historical origins of 
government food policy in Nigeria, one is drawn to the recommendations 
of a series of government commissions -- the Udoji Commission, the 
Adebo Commission, and the Anti-Inflation Task Forces, for example7 
which were impaneled to investigate sources of labor unrest and to 
resolve major labor stoppages, The fundamental issue driving urban 
unrest, they noted, was concern with the real value of urban incomes 
and the erosion of purchasing power because of inflation. While 
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recommending higher wages, these commissions also noted that pay 
increases represented only a short-run solution; in the words of the 
Adebo Commission, "It was clear to us that, unless certain recommended 
steps were taken and actively pursued, a pay award would have little 
or no meaning, H HHence," the Commission noted, "our extraordinary 
preoccupation with the causes of the cost of living situation, "8 As 
part of its efforts to confront the cause of the rising cost of 
living, the Commission went on to recommend a number of basic 
measures, among them a number of proposals "to improve the food supply 
situation, ,, 9 The origins of many elements of Nigeria's agricultural 
program lie in the recommendations of these reports, 
Urban consumers in Africa constitute a vigilant and potent 
pressure group demanding low priced food, Because they are poor, they 
spend much of their income on food; most studies suggest that urban 
consumers in Africa spend between 50 and 60 percent of their incomes 
on food. lo In addition, when personal incomes rise, the demand for 
many food crops rises even faster; this is particularly the case for 
milk, sugar, rice and wheat. 11 Changes in the price of food therefore 
have a major impact on the economic well-being of urban dwellers in 
Africa, and this relationship is strengthening in some cases as 
development proceeds. Urban dwellers therefore pay close attention to 
the issue of food prices, 
Urban consumers are potent because they are geographically 
concentrated and strategically located, Because of their geographic 
concentration, they can quickly be organized; and because they control 
such basic facilities as transport, communications, and public 
services, they can impose deprivations on others. They are therefore 
influential, Urban unrest forms an important prelude to changes of 
governments in Africa, and the cost and availability of food supplies 
is a significant factor promoting urban disaffection. 12 
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It should be noted that it is not only the worker who cares, 
It is also the employer. llmployers care about food prices because 
food is a wages good; with higher food prices, wages must rise and, 
all else being equal, profits fall. Governments care about food 
prices not only because they are employers in their own right but also 
because as owners of industries and promoters of industrial 
development programs they seek to protect industrial profits. 
Indicative of the significance of these interests is that the unit 
that sets agricultural prices often resides not in the Ministry of 
Agriculture but in the Ministry of Finance or Commerce. 
When urban unrest begins among food consumers, then, political 
discontent often rapidly spreads to upper echelons of the polity: it 
comes to include those whose incomes come from profits, not wages, and 
those in charge of major bureaucracies, Political regimes that are 
unable to supply low cost food are seen as dangerously incompetent and 
as failing to protect the interests of key elements of the social 
order. In alliance with the urban masses, influential elites are 
likely to shift their political loyalties and to replace those in 
power, Thus it was that protests over food s hortages and rising 
prices formed a critical prelude to the coup that unseated Busia and 
led to the period of political maneuvers and flux that threatened to 
overthrow the government of Arap Moi, 
s 
It is ironic, but true, that among those governments most 
committed to low cost food are the "radical" governments in Africa, 
Despite their stress on economic equality, they impose lower prices on 
the commodity from which the poorest of the poor -- the peasant 
farmers -- derive their incomes, A major reason for their behavior is 
that they are deeply committed to rapid industrialization; moreover, 
they are deeply committed to higher real wages for urban workers and 
have strong institutional ties to organized labor, 
We can thus understand the demand for low cost food, Its 
impetus derives from the urban areas, Its origins lie in the fact 
that food is a major staple and that higher prices for such staples 
threaten the real value of wages .!.!li! profits. And it is supported by 
governments, both out of political necessity and, on the part of more 
radical ones, out of ideological preference. 
To investigate the validity of this political interpretation 
of the origins of food price policy, I have examined data collected by 
the United States Department of Agriculture and published in its 
report entitled Food Policies and Perspectiyes in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. 13 Resource constraints and problems with the data led me to 
concentrate on two commodities -- rice and maize, While maize is 
grown and consumed almost everywhere in Africa, rice is much more 
frequently imported than grown, While analyzing patterns of 
government intervention in retail markets for both commodities, I have 
therefore had to confine my attention to the control of retail prices 
in the case of rice, The results of my analysis are contained in 
tables 2-4. 
The basic hypothesis underlying the interpretation advanced 
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above is that insofar as agricultural commodities are staples of urban 
consumption, then political pressures will lead to their being subject 
to price controls, The equations contain a dummy variable which takes 
on the value of one if the relevant commodity is reported by the USDA 
to be a staple of urban consumption' otherwise it takes on the value 
of zero, The hypothesis is supported when the value of the 
coefficient of this dummy variable is positive and statistically 
significant, In all three cases, the estimates support the hypothesis 
(see tables 2-4). 
The second hypothesis is that urban unrest is driven by the 
erosion of the real value of urban incomes brought on by inflation,14
The relationship between inflation and market intervention is 
therefore expected to be positive and statistically significant. As 
seen in tables 2-4, the coefficients tend to be of the predicted sign, 
although in two instances attaining levels of significance too low to 
lend persuasive support to this hypothesis, 
The interpretation advanced above also leads to the hypothesis 
that ideological preferences count, In particular, it suggests that 
the more deeply governments are committed to the promotion of 
industrial growth and to the protection of the interests of the 
working class, the more likely governments are to intervene in efforts 
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Table 2 
Dependent Variable: Probability of Government Regulation of the Retail Price of Maize, 
Independent Maximum 
Variable Likelihood 
Estimate of 
Probit Coefficient 
Government's Ideology 
Marxist-Leninist 0. 912 
African socialist 0 .532 
Capitalist -0. 729 
Staple of Urban 
Consumption 1,297 
Inflation 0.107 
Constant -1. 776 
Estimated R2 = 0.54
Proportion Cases Correctly Predicted= 0. 757 
1. One-tailed test, 
2, 30 degrees of freedom, 
Ratio of 
M,L,E, to 
Standard 
Error 
1. 435 
0,786 
-0. 988 
2. 411 
1. 414 
Significance Leve1Cl) 
Assuming Assuming 
t-Distribution<2> Normal 
Distributioll 
,10 ,08 
. 025 . 01 
. 10 ,08 
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Table 3 
Dependent Variable: Probability of Government Regulation of the Producer Price of Maize. 
Independent 
Variable 
Government's ideology 
Marxist-Leninist 
African socialist 
Capitalist 
Staple of Urban 
Consnmption 
Inflation 
Constant 
Estimated R2 = 0, 61 
Maximum 
Likelihood 
Estimate of 
Probit Coefficient 
0 . 967 
0,300 
-. 795 
1. 780 
0.106 
-1. 413 
Proportion Cases Correctly Predicted= 0,706 
1. Ono-tailed test, 
2, 30 degrees of freedom, 
Ratio of 
M,L,E, to 
Standard 
Error 
1. 470
0. 421 
-<>.098 
2. 775 
1.270 
Significance Leve1(l) 
Assuming Assuming 
t-Distribution(2) Normal 
Distribution 
. 10 ,08 
.oos ,003 
. 12 .12 
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to secure low cost food. 15 In a recent book, Crawford Young
classifies African governments as Marxist-Leninist, African Socialist, 
and Capitalist, 16 Constructing dummy variables with the residual 
category consisting of governments with no discernible ideology, the 
interpretation suggests: 
1. That tho coefficients for the first two dummy variables 
those indicating that the governments are Marxist-Leninist or 
Socialist -- would be positive whereas the coefficient for tho third 
� that indicating that the government is capitalist -- would be 
negative, 
2. That tho magnitude of the coefficients would vary, with 
that for Marxist-Leninist governments being the largest and that for 
capitalist governments being tho smallest, 
3, That all coefficients would be statically significant. 
These throe general predictions translate into 20 specific predictions 
about the properties of tho coefficients to the variables included in 
these three equations, Of those roughly two-thirds are fulfilled. In 
two of the three equations, tho relative magnitude of tho coefficients 
conforms to my prediction, In eight of nine cases, tho signs behave 
properly, In throe or four of the possible nine cases are the 
coefficients significant, depending upon whether one wants to be 
extremely generous or merely very generous about the standards of 
significance employed, It should also bo noted that in one case (that 
of governmental regulation of the retail price of rice) satisfactory 
results were only achieved when an additional control was introduced 
7b 
Table 4 
Dependent Variable: Probability of Government Regulation of the Retail Price of Rice, 
Independent Maximum 
Variable Likelihood 
Estimate of 
Probit Coefficient 
Government's Ideology 
Marxist-Leninist 1. 095 
African socialist 1,445 
Capitalist 0.111 
Staple of Urban 
Consumption 2.265 
Inflation 0,113 
Percent Labor Force in 
Government Service -{) .515 
Constant -2. 237 
Estimated R2 = 0,61 
Proportion Cases Correctly Predicted = 0,838 
1. One-tailed test, 
2. 30 degrees of freedom, 
Ratio of 
M.L. E. to 
Standard 
Error 
1.266 
1. 498
0.153 
3 .576 
2. 371 
-1. 329 
Significance Leve1(1) 
Assuming Assuming 
t-Distribution<2> Normal 
Distribution 
.12 . 12 
.10 ,08 
,005 . 001 
. 025 . 01 
.10 . 10 
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for the "size of government," 
These estimates, it should be noted, are of probit, not 
regression, coefficients. The reason for employing probit analysis is 
that the dependent variables take on but two values: either a 
government does or does not intervene in a market, Because of the 
limited nature of the dependent variables, estimates of regression 
coefficients would be biased; probit analysis allows unbiased 
estimates, While, unlike regression coefficients, probit coefficients 
are difficult to interpret, nonetheless significance tests can be 
applied to them, In applying these tests, I have used both the t and 
normal distributions; the ratio of the maximum likelihood estimate of 
a probit coefficient to its standard error asymptotically approximates 
the normal distribution, Moreover, models estimated with probit 
techniques can be evaluated in terms of the R2 statistic and in terms 
of the percent of cases in which the model predicts the correct state 
of the dependent variables (i,e, in this case, whether the government 
did or did not intervene in a particular market), The R2 statistic 
for these three equations ranges between ,54 and ,61. The equations 
correctly predict ,76, . 71, and ,84 of the 38 cases; by chance alone, 
we could predict ,55, . 63, and ,73 of them correctly. 
Cash Crops 
African governments also pursue low price policies with 
respect to export crops: cocoa, coffee, cotton and so forth, Most do 
so by maintaining public bureaucracies called marketing boards which 
serve as government sanctioned monopsonies, Using their market power, 
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maximiz ing at the expense of revenue collections from the industry or 
that it used a higher (possibly long-term) estimate of the elasticity 
of production. Nonetheless, the results are sufficiently impressive 
to suggest that the model of revenue maximiz ation provides a 
persuasive first approximation to a model of government behavior. 
Scarcity of data render it impossible to replicate Bovet and 
Unnevehr's analysis in other nations in Africa. Only unsatisfactory 
substitutes are possible. One is an analysis of the coefficients of 
nominal protection, which measure the ratio of domestic to world 
prices. The smaller the ooeff ioient of nominal protection, the 
further the domestic price lies below the world market price, Such 
coefficients have been calculated for thirteen nations in Africa by 
the World Bank, 2 1
With s o  few observations, there i s  little i n  fact that can be 
done with data. Nonetheless, I have been able to test the hypotheses 
that: (1) the greater the demand for public revenue, i, e, the more 
activist the government, the lower the level of nominal protection 
coefficients; and (2) the lower the supply of public revenue from 
non-agricultural sources, then the higher the level of these 
coefficients, The rationale underlying both hypotheses is that 
price-setting behavior by African governments with respect to export 
crops is driven by the need for public revenues and that the desparity 
between domestic and international prices for exports provides a 
measure of agricultural taxation, 22
As an indicator of government activism I have used as an index 
12 
the percentage of the national labor force in public employment. As 
an indicator of alternative sources of tax revenues (and thus of the 
adequacy of revenue supply) I have noted the existence or nonexistence 
of commercial petroleum deposits, The results of this "mini-analysis" 
are present in table 5, As there are no restrictions on the value of 
the dependent variable, the coefficients in this table are ordinary 
least squares estimates, The signs of the coefficients are as 
predicted, The variables included in the equation "explain" nearly 
two-fifths of the variation in the pricing behavior of the thirteen 
African governments, Significance levels are low, however, The 
results generate a sense of encouragement, not conviction. 
To push this effort further, I chose an alternative dependent 
variable: the level of overvaluation of the domestic currency, 
Relevant data have been compiled by Jansen in her background paper for 
the 1981 World Bank report2 3  and have been supplemented with data 
taken from Pick's currency yearbook, 2 4  Combining data from these 
sources allows a SO percent increase in the number of observations 
(from 13 to 19), 
Overvaluation adversely affects those who earn their incomes 
in foreign markets, It benefits those who use the domestic currency 
to import from abroad, Among the foremost of these benef ioiaries are 
the import-substituting industries who, because of overvaluation, are 
able to import capital equipment more cheaply, In some oases, 
overvaluation is chosen as a matter of deliberate policy, In other 
oases, it results from the maintenance of fixed exchange rates in 
9 
the boards set low domestic prices for their crops; they then sell the 
crops abroad at prices prevailing in the world market, The difference 
between the sale and purchase price is accumulated by the marketing 
board in the form of trading revenues; in most cases, these revenues 
simply become the possession of the national treasury. The marketing 
boards thus serve as instruments of agricultural taxation, 17 And 
agricultural pricing policy, it would appear, is made out of primary 
regard for the securing of government revenues. 
Data problems make it extremely difficult to test this 
interpretation; we simply lack sufficient data to support systematic 
investigations of the pricing policies of governments. One attempt 
was made, however, by Bovet and Unnevehr in their study of cocoa 
exports from Togo, 18 Bovet and Unnevehr note that the net revenues 
from exports are 
where NR stands for net revenues, Q for the quantity of exports, PL 
for the domestic or local price and PW for world price, A revenue 
maximiz ing government would choose a domestic price so as to maximiz e 
its net revenue; that is, it would solve the problem 
Simple calculus yields the first order conditions for this 
maximiz ation: 19
PL Multiplying both sides by "Q"" yields:
Or, simplifying, 
where 'II the price elasticity of production, 
0 
Given knowledge of the elasticity of production, then, the 
government could establish a ratio of the local to world price which 
would maximiz e the revenues it earned from the export of the 
commodity, On the basis of the evidence they collected, Bovet and 
10 
Unnevehr are convinced that the government of Togo is doing just that, 
As they conclude, 
The elasticity of short-term supply was estimated at .Sl. Using 
this elasticity optimal revenue maximiz ing prices were calculated 
for 1967-76, The results show that [marketing board pricing] 
policies have maximized government revenues, 2 0
I n  fact, the evidence presented by Bovet and Unnevehr shows 
that the producer prices paid by the Board consistently lay slightly 
above the revenue maximiz ing prices predicted by their model, This 
implies either that the government had other objectives that it was 
Table S 
Dependent Variable: Coefficient of Nominal Protection, 
Independent 
Variable 
Percent Labor Force 
in Public Services 
Petrolenm Deposits 
Constant 
Estimated R2 
= 0,39 
Regression 
Coefficient 
-0.241 
0. 346 
0. 904 
Ratio of 
Regression 
Coefficient to 
Standard Error 
-2.276 
1.296 
l, One-tailed test, 10 degrees of freedom, 
12a 
Significance Level(l) 
,025 
.13 
periods when the rate of domestic inflation exceeds the rate of 
inflation abroad, In either case, the result is the transfer of 
resources out of export industries, such as agriculture, and into 
industries with high propensities to import, From the point of view 
13 
of export agriculture, then, overvaluation represents but another kind 
of tax, 
These arguments suggest that the greater the impetus for 
industrializ ation, the higher the level of overvaluation. This 
impetus could be measured in terms of the ideological commitment to 
rapid industrializ ation (as suggested by Young's categoriz ation of the 
preferences of governments) and by the siz e of the existing stock of 
industries (as measured by the percent of the labor force in urban 
employment), The discussion also suggests the importance of 
controlling for the rate of inflation as a possible determinant of the 
level of overvaluation, 
As seen in table 6, testing these hypotheses lends moderate 
support to our analysis, We had expected positive coefficients in 
cases where governments propounded Marxist-Leninist or socialist 
ideologies and negative coefficients where they adhered to capitalist 
ideologies; we also expected positive coefficients for the variables 
measuring the rate of inflation and the siz e of industry, In every 
case but one, the signs of the coefficients confirmed to expectations, 
Only two of the coefficients are statistically significant at 
conventional levels of confidence, however, This collection of 
variables explains SO percent of the variance in government exchange 
Table 6 
Dependent Variable: Ratio of Official to Unilateral Exchange Rate, 
Independent Regression Ratio of 
Variable Coefficient Regression 
Coefficient to 
Standard Error 
Government's Ideology 
Marxist-Leninist 3 . 618 2.122 
African socialist -0. 697 -0.528 
Capitalist -1.120 -0,754 
Percent Labor Force 
in Urban Areas 0. 684 1.272 
Inflation 0.117 1. s 84 
Constant -0. 419 
Estimated R2 o. s o
F = 2. 642, not significant, 
1. One-tailed test, 13 degrees of freedom, 
Significance 
Level (1) 
.OS 
.17 
, 13 
, 10 
13a 
rate policies. 
Conclusion 
The purpose of this paper has been to summariz e recent 
interpretations of government behavior toward agriculture in Africa 
and to assess their credibility, With respect to the marketing of 
food crops, governments were seen as intervening on behalf of 
organiz ed urban interests; for cash crops, they were viewed as 
manipulating prices in order to tax, both so as to collect public 
revenues and so as to redistribute purchasing power to the consumers 
of imports, Such interpretations seek to account for the generally 
draconian nature of agricultural prices, The tests of these 
14 
interpretations reported in this paper indicate that we may well be on 
the right track in attempting to explain the behavior of governments 
toward their agricultural industries but that we will still have far 
to go, 
15 
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